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Craig: Some problems with values clarification

Educators jump on the
bandwagon without
understanding implications

Some
problems with
values
clarification
By Robert Craig
Values clarification, which consists of a series of
practical exercises to aid the student in clarifying his or
her values, has received a great deal of attention in the
past decade. It is quite devoid of theory and what theory
there is often is contradictory or ambiguous. In Values
Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies for
Teachers and Students, Sidney Simon, et. al., describes
four approaches to the clarification of values. The only
one they accept is their own.
The firs t approach is termed moralizing . They define
this as the "inculcation of the adult's values upon the
young.'" They find two problems wi th this approach. In
the first place, there are a number of conflicting sources
tor value Input- parents, lhe church, the peer group, etc.;
and the young do not know which source to use when
determ ining their personal values. Secondly, moralizing
results In a dichotomy between theory and practice, for
the individual verbally accepts the value of the authority
but does not carry the prescriptions out in actual practice.
Yet there Is a difference between moralizing and in·
doctrination. Moralizing need not necessarily be lndoctri·
nating. Likewise there Is a difference between an authority
and authoritarian. Quite often we accept the opinions of
authorllles without having those opinions inculcated In an
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authoritarian manner. In fact It Is often necessary to listen
to the advice of experts such as clergymen and teachers,
for their experience can aid us in making viable moral decisions. The term moralizing Is used in a pejorative sense by
Sirpon and his friends, and this need not be the case. They
never define the term, although they give examples of it.
We often say that a novel has a moral or we suggest
that the moral to X type of behavior is such and such. This
Is using the term moral in a positive sense, and the suggeslion is being made in ordinary discourse that it may be
beneficial to learn from such moralizing. Thus moralizing
need not be the indoctrinating affair Simon, et. al, say it is,
and deriving morals from different sources Is a valuable
me thod of values clarification .
Secondly, Simon suggests that some leachers and
other adults adopt a laissez-faire atti tude loward the trans·
mission of values. They base this laissez-faire attitude on
the assumption thal values are relative and that the
teacher or parent should not lnlervene In the process of
value selection. The result of such a process, Simon suggests, is confusion and frustration on the part of the student. Without defending the laissez-faire position, it is evi·
dent that it is closer to the values clarlflcatlon approach
than Simon imagines. The laissez.faire approach is similar
to the values clarification approach for two reasons.
1. The emphasis of values clarification is on ethical
relativism-values reside within the Ind ividual; they are
subjective. This characteris tic o f values clarlflcatlon will
be crillclzed shOrtly.
2. Simon tells teachers not to intervene in the process o f value selection. The s tudents should be free to
choose their own pre ferences without teacher intervention. This would seem to lead to the same confusion and
frustration he claims is part o f the laissez-faire approach
because the student would have no basis except his own
preferences when deciding values. What II the student
comes to the conclusion that smoking mariguane is morally acceptable. Shouldn't the teacher point out such facts
(not moral opinions even, yet a type of justification nevertheless), that smoking It may be dangerous to the student's health, that it is against lhe law, that organized
crime is often involved in lls growing and distribution, etc.
Without teacher intervention how can the student make
an intelligent moral decision. So lhe laissez-faire view
which Simon condemns is Quite close to the values clarifi·
c ation process he advocates; and there are numerous
problems with his positive suggestions that sludent's values are subjective and that teac hers should nol intervene
in the student valuing process.
The third notion o f valuing Simo n and his friends con·
demn is modeling. This means that the teacher ought not
to present himself or herself as a model for students to
emulate, to describe modeling negatively. Simon again
suggests that modeling leads to confusion because the
student has so many models to choose from: parents,
teachers, and so on. He even mentions movie stars as a
positive source of modeling. The values o f some movie
stars do not seem to be positive nor do they lend to the
building up of the human community. They are material is·
tic and individualistic. It IS unfor1una1e that Simon isn't
more selective in his examples of modeling behavior.
What can we say about modeling as a method of
values inculcation? First, there Is the work of Bandura and
Walters on modeling in which they demonstrate that
group modeling is a positive Instrument in changing
negative behavior to that wh ich is more acceptable. When
students experience another group exhibiting rewarding
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behavior they tend to want to emulate such behavior and
to develop the positive values which accompany It. Second ly, the work o f Lawrence Kohlberg suggests that students viewing the moral reasons for action on the part of individuals at a higher moral stage than their own lnlult that
the reasons and moral actions are actually preferable to
their own. So they model the moral actions of those individuals at a higher moral level than their own. Lastly we
can use our own experience to demonstrate that Simon is
incorrect: that modeling has a part to play in moral growth.
Haven't we all had teachers who were moral models for us
so much so that w e desired to work harder in their classes
to please them? Haven't there been adults who have been
moral models to us and have helped our moral growth?
This is largely an empirical question, but the answer is in
the affirmative in this writers experience.
Lastly, let's examine some o f the aspects of the values clarification approach as enumerated by Simon. We
will find thal both its theory and practice are misleading
and even harmful. Philosophers have not come lo any
agreement concerning the definition of the term value.
The theories concerning the nature of value cover a wide
area from natural law theories which view value as an objective property to an existentialistic ethic which sugges ts that values are personal choices. The values clarification people list seven criteria o f values which are supposed to cover its necessary and sufficient conditions.
Valuing is composed of seven sub-processes.
1. prizing and cherishing
2. publicly affirming, when appropriate
3. choosing from alternatives
4. choosing after consideration o f consequences
5. choosing freely
6. acting
7. acting with a pattern, consistency and repetition•
As John Stewart suggests, the values clarification
approach is quite superficial and mislead ing. Simon says
the values clarification approach leads to an indepth
examination of values.' The truth of the matter is that
opinions and feelings are what are examine.cl in the valuing
process and not values at all. Stewart mentions four weak·
nesses with the Simon approach to values. First of all,
they commit the "error of reiflcatlon of hypostatizatlon.'"
This means that the values clarification people convert the
Idea of value Into a concrete entity. Thus values are
viewed as independent entities exis ting apart from persons. Values are not things, but they ind icate a deeper
conceptual system about the world which includes notions of good and bad. This makes the values clarification
notion of values very superficial.
Stewart's second criticism of the values clarification
approach sugges ts that its proponents emphasize the
content of values instead of the " relatively more important
underlying structure of one's thin king and valuing
Con-."•
tent is concerned with what one thinks; structure Is concerned with why one th inks it. It is certainly the case that
the cognitive developmental psychologists such as Piaget
and Kohlberg see content and struc ture interrelating. The
values clarification exponents abandon s tructure in place
of content and much of the content dealt with is trivial at
that.
Thirdly, Simon commits the error of separating content lrom process in his discussion of moral education.
He identifies process with indoc trination and thus tries to
14
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rely solely on the content of valuing. This contention is
misleading at best.
Lately, it is evident that the values clarification pea·
pie's theory is involved in ethical relativism, as was previously mentioned . This means that everyone is right about
his or her values. Ultimately it leads to the view that only
opinions and personal preferences matter in making moral
judgments. Ethical relativism means that no values can be
proven better than o thers; that disagreement about the
rightness or wrongness of moral actions is to be avoided.
If ethical relativism is true, the values o f Adolph Hitler are
as defensible as the values of Jesus Christ. There is no
way of telling which values are better than others; and the
values clarification strategy leads to such a conclusion.
Two other problems with the values clarification approach are brought out by Alan Lockwood. He notes that
the exponents fail to distinguish moral from non-moral
issues. Thus students are asked to clarify their values o n
such widespread issues as their favorite occupation to
capitol punishment. Since a value is defined in relation to
one's personal tastes and preferences there is no way of
sorting out these preferences from issues or actions that
affect the welfare of human beings. In other words, the
dis tinction between moral and non-moral values collapses. As Lockwood says:
A decision to support policies invo lving the termination of human life Is different from a decision involv·
Ing one's preference In entertainment. Decisions of
the former type are moral value decisions, while the
latter are non-moral value decisions.•
Lastly, many values clarification activities tend to
jeopardize the private rights of students, for many of the
strategies get students to disclose Information about
themselves and their families. Much of this is private Information which could cause hostility in the family. Many
ol the techniques of values clarification are of this nature
and students are told to disclose anylhlng from their
sexual preferences to their family relationships. In our age
of mass information we are especially In need of privacy
rights.
There is much more that could be said about the
values clarification strategies. It is evident from the above
that the values clarification program lacks a secure theo·
retical foundation and that there is a paucity of research to
support its use. It Is just another bandwagon educators
have jumped on withou t thoroughly understanding Its Implications. It is true that moral education is extremely Important and that the schools should have a place in such
education, but values clarification is not the way.
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